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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we argue that there are foundational dilemmas in theoretical physics related 
to the concept of reality and the nature of mathematics in physics. Physical theory is treated as a 
conceptual organism which develops under the weight of its internal contradictions.  
The paper discusses in depth the problem of objective reality in physics and its relation to 
scientific practice. Then, it explores the problematic relation between physical meaning and 
mathematics in modern physical theory, followed by a discussion of the trend of contemporary 
physics to replace physical principles with pure mathematical principles. Finally, it discusses 
the problem of logical coherence in modern physical theory. The paper emphasizes the 
importance of resolving these dilemmas to the proper practice of theoretical physics. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There is a growing feeling among an increasing number of theoretical physicists that 
theoretical physics is in deep structural crisis. Basically, it is not a specific concrete crisis 
related to a set of concrete theoretical and practical problems, but a deep structural crisis lying 
at the very heart of theoretical physics as an enterprise. It could threaten the whole enterprise of 
theoretical physics. 
 
In particular, in quantum mechanics, the very concept of objective reality is questioned 
and the dominant interpretation tends to negate the concept of a pure objective reality, and to 
accord the subjective observer a privileged role in determining reality on a random basis. It will 
be argued, on methodological bases, that this negation endangers the whole enterprise of 
theoretical physics. 
Secondly, it will be argued that the primacy and priority of abstract mathematics in 20th 
century theoretical physics problematize the very possibility of physical meaning in physics. In 
this regard, modern physics, epitomized by special relativity, general relativity, black hole 
physics and the various formulations of quantum mechanics, is thoroughly contrasted with 
classical physics, particularly as regards concept formation in both. 
Thirdly, the problem of theoretical complexity and logical coherence in physical theory is 
addressed and highlighted, in view of the problem of infinities and singularities in quantum 
field theory and modern cosmological theories. 
One of the tools used to investigate these major dilemmas is the view, previously worked 
out by the author (Ghassib, 1988; 2012a; 2012b), that physical theory is an organism, rather 
than a set of loosely connected partial theories. This view turns out to be essential for 
appreciating the importance and reality of the dilemmas referred to above. 
 
The author believes that some of the fundamental concrete problems in contemporary 
theoretical physics would be intractable without a thorough investigation of the dilemmas 
referred to. 
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This paper will consist of five broad sections. Section 1 will deal with the meaning of 
sickness in theoretical physics and its contemporary symptoms. Section 2 will deal with the 
problem of ideology and dogma in theoretical physics, in relation to the problem of reality. 
Section 3 will deal with the problematic relationship between mathematics and physical 
meaning. Section 4 will deal with the problematic relationship between physical principles and 
mathematical principles. The last section will deal with the problem of logical coherence in 
physical theory. 
 
 
1. Physics as Organism: 
 
Modern Physics does not seem to be immune to dogma, ideology and even bigotry             
(Ghassib, 1993; 2003; Maxwell, 2008). These defects have played a noticeable role in 
conceptualizing theoretical physics, particularly in 20th century physics (Jammer, 1966), even 
though the two mechanisms of critique and experimentation tend to limit this role and shorten 
its duration of efficacy. This in itself is a form of structural and fundamental tension and crisis. 
Physics boasts of its objectivity and its growing appropriation of reality. The three defects 
mentioned clearly express subjectivity of the worst kind. Thus, they can be considered a form of 
malady or sickness afflicting the body of theoretical physics (Ghassib, 2012a; 2012b).          
 
This characterization implies the idea that physics is a living organism, which grows 
under the pressure of its internal and external contradictions. It is indeed so, as I have shown in 
a previous work ( Ghassib, 1988).              
 
Theoretical physics seems to suffer fundamentally from a number of structural maladies 
which express real dilemmas that urgently need to be addressed. These dilemmas do not 
primarily consist of the inability of physical theory to appropriate and explain new experiments, 
as was the case at the turn of the 20th century (Heisenberg, 1949; Kragh, 1999).                   
Rather, they are fundamental and internal conceptual and methodological dilemmas that affect 
the very enterprise of theoretical physics. There are at least four major domains in modern 
theoretical physics, each of which is a site of a major fundamental dilemma. 
 
 
2. Ideology and the Problem of Reality: 
 
Physics has erected its glory and credibility as reliable knowledge, and has fought its 
battles with dogma and despotism, on the basis of the notion of an objective reality, which can 
be known using varied creative scientific rationality that is the climax of rational thought 
(Ghassib, 2012b; 2012c). Physics has had to follow a very tortuous and laborious path to 
establish the notion of objective reality in modern culture. 
Yet, we find a tendency in modern physics to transcend the notion of objective reality, 
and even negate and deny it, without pondering the enormous methodological, epistemological 
and ethical ramifications of such a move. Such anti-realists behave as though the many cultural 
battles fought by physics in the last few centuries were mere empty bubbles devoid of all 
meaning and value.                       
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Quite a few of the top quantum physicists have gone out of their way to deconstruct the 
notion of objective reality and negate its necessity in physics and elsewhere (Grib, 2013; 
Dorato, 2014; Pusey, 2012; Briggs, 2013; Squires, 1996; Mermin, 1985; Rogers, 1999). 
Niels Bohr seems to adopt a neo-Kantian stance, whereby physics cannot, in virtue of its 
basic methodology, have access to an objective reality, and can only have access to phenomena 
within the context of humanly constructed experimental set-ups, thereby opening the domain of 
physics to magic, mysticism, and religion. ( Cale, 2002; Tanona, 2002; Degen, 1989; Cuffaro, 
2011).            
Heisenberg promotes the notion of potential reality, which is a virtual space of 
probabilities, which can be transformed into actuality by observation and measurement, thus, 
endowing this human-all-too-human operation with the power to create being out of nothing 
(Heisenberg, 1949; 1971; 1979).                
Eugene Wigner, Von Neumann and Pauli went so far as to consider human consciousness 
a necessary condition of the collapse of the wave function, and, thus, a condition of concrete 
material being (Wigner, 1961; 1967; Jammer, 1966). 
Major physicists and mathematicians, such as Von Neumann and Dirac, embarked on 
inventing an elaborate mathematical scheme to ground this basically ideological dogma and 
support it with mathematical proofs and axioms. (Birkhoff, 1936; von Neumann,1955).            
When Louis de Broglie, the founder of wave mechanics, challenged these subjectivist 
idealist interpretations of quantum mechanics with his objective interpretation, known as the 
double solution or pilot wave interpretation (De Broglie, 1923; 1924; 1927; 1987), at the 1927 
Fifth Solvay Conference (Valentini, 2010), he was subjected to a sustained barrage of ridicule 
and verbal abuse by the Copenhagen “gang”, which succeeded in silencing him for twenty-five 
years at least. Only after David Bohn rediscovered his interpretation in 1952 (Bohm, 1952) did 
he dare to resume his work on his objective interpretation.   
         
This is not to say that the De Broglie-Bohn interpretation is entirely satisfactory or even 
as satisfactory as the Copenhagen family of interpretations, but the point is that the suppression 
of De Broglie’s interpretation in the way it was ruthlessly suppressed cannot be explained and 
justified on a purely scientific basis. It was basically an ideological philosophical choice, and in 
fact in recent decades, quite a few studies have been conducted, which have shown the extent to 
which that choice was ideological and philosophical (Lee, 2006; Cuffaro,2011). 
What should be pondered here is, why was De Broglie not given the opportunity to 
defend his interpretive scheme and to defend a conception of reality that physics had struggled 
for centuries to establish and sustain? How are we to explain the passionate vehemence with 
which De Broglie was confronted in 1927, and with which Einstein himself was confronted on 
more than one occasion following 1927 (First, 2012; Norsen, 2005) ? It is, of course, ideology, 
and philosophical dogma-- the usual struggle between subjectivism and realism, idealism and 
materialism. 
Ever since the Scientific Revolution in the 17th Century, physics has been a thorn in the 
flesh of ideology and philosophical dogma. As a result, the latter has tended to modify its tenets 
to accommodate itself to this scientific challenge. However, with the advent of quantum 
mechanics and the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, an attempt has been made 
to reverse the issue, whereby subjectivist ideology would attempt to appropriate fundamental 
physics and use it as weapon against competing ideologies. What is at stake in all these battles 
is the concept of objective, mind-independent, reality. 
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In this regard, the Einstein-Bohr debate was the basis of subsequent debates (Jammer, 
1974; Bohr, 1949; Shimony, 1993). 
Einstein courageously and brilliantly challenged the Copenhagen clique on that particular 
issue, as he realized what it means to abandon this concept or negate it or neutralize it. He 
refused to surrender to their, particularly Bohr’s, alluring reasoning and to their ideological 
tactics (Whitaker, 2006; Ballentine, 1972; Stachel, 1983; Einstein, 1948). His tenacity was 
interpreted, wrongly, as a reactionary response and prejudice bordering on senility (Fine, 1986).                          
Instead of listening carefully to what Einstein was saying, and to cooperate with him to 
find a satisfactory way to rehabilitate the concept of objective reality, they were concerned only 
with combating, refuting, rebuffing and ridiculing his arguments. It was obviously an 
ideological war. 
The question that was deliberately absented from the Copenhagen discourse was: What 
prompted Einstein so stubbornly to stick to the concept of objective reality and defend it? Why 
did Einstein deem this concept a necessary condition for any meaningful physical theory, and 
perhaps, for other concerns? These questions could be more broadly posed as follows: Why did 
Einstein and why do we insist on the integrity of the concept of objective reality? Why do we 
stubbornly stick to it? Why do we resist abandoning it, even when we are prepared to abandon 
classical physics as such? Why are we prepared to abandon certain essential features of classical 
physics, but not prepared to abandon this ontological basis?. 
The full answer could be quite elaborate and multi-disciplinary, and would of necessity go 
beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, we will give here a partial answer as follows. 
Our basic thesis here is that scientific practice as such presupposes objective reality 
(Ghassib, 2012b).   
Thus, the interpretations, which negate or condone it, enter into contradiction with the 
very practice which they purport to be produced by it. Thus, with these interpretations, 
scientific practice entangles itself into a self-contradiction, which could lead to the demise of 
the whole scientific enterprise. It is a form of epistemological suicide. 
It is our contention that scientific practice presupposes scientific rationality. The basis of 
the latter is: to confirm the existence of a significant phenomenon, to specify it via physical 
quantities, which are in turn fixed via mathematics and measurement, and to demonstrate their 
mechanisms of emergence and the process of this emergence (Bhaskar, 1978).      
The essence of this rationality is the dialectical relationship between mathematized 
theorization and precise experimentation. (Ghassib, 2012c).                          
In this sense, scientific rationality presupposes that nature is a physical system consisting 
of an infinite collection of physical subsystems which interact with each other. These 
interactions are the only causal sources of physical phenomena. These subsystems are unified 
via a network of physical quantities, which are related to each other in various ways. These 
diverse relations govern the way these physical quantities vary. Scientific practice has no sense 
and no concrete purpose without this ontological picture of nature and natural phenomena.     
Thus, the Copenhagen interpretation seems to blow up the very basis, meaning, purpose 
and raison d’etre of scientific practice. 
It is also to be noticed that the Copenhagen interpretation--or, interpretations, to be more 
precise-- emanates from the act of measurement. This choice is rooted in positivism and its 
noticeable impact on theoretical physics in the first third of the 20th century. 
Positivism regards the act of measurement the pivot of scientific practice and the central 
determining component of physical experience. 
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However, this choice is not an inevitable choice. One could as well start from 
experimentally validated theory by considering the latter the essence of knowledge, the axis of 
scientific practice and the determining factor of physical experience. That was precisely what 
was done by David Bohm, at least in his 1952 paper ( Bohm, 1952).                   
Bohm did not start from the act of measuring macroscopic quantities, as Bohr and 
Heisenberg specifically had done, but started from the Schrodinger equation, from which he 
derived two equations, which were amenable to a causal objectivist interpretation. This suggests 
that philosophy plays an important role in the interpretations of quantum mechanics. Thus, 
whereas the Copenhagen interpretations presuppose an amalgam of positivism and subjective 
idealism, the 1952 Bohm interpretation presupposes a form of critical realism  (Bhaskar, 1978).                       
The problem is that the Copenhagen interpretations have tended to conceal their philosophical 
presuppositions and give the impression that they follow necessarily from purely physical 
experiments and ideas. 
 
 
 
3. The Problem of Meaning in Physics: 
 
The essential point here is that, in classical physics, physical meaning comes before 
mathematical representation and precedes it logically. Accordingly, mathematical 
representation comes as a culmination of the process of meaning generation and synthesis. For 
example, the Newtonian concept of force has a determinate meaning prior to its mathematical 
representation and prior to Newton’s equations of motion. Its meaning follows from Newton’s 
conception of the Universe and the principle of causality. It is an expression of material 
interaction between material particles in absolute space and absolute time. It is the basic cause 
of change. Its mathematical properties and its role in the laws of nature and in physical 
equations follow specifically form this definite physical meaning. Similarly, the classical 
concepts of electric and magnetic fields have a definite physical meaning prior logically and 
historically prior to the formulation of Maxwell’s equations. The latter came as an expression 
and extension of their meaning-- as a crowning moment and completion of this meaning. 
(Ghassib, 2012b).                            
Besides, in classical physics, the laws of nature logically precede the natural phenomena 
to be explained, and constitute a basis for explanations. 
Let us compare these features of classical physics with corresponding features of quantum 
mechanics. Let us start with wave mechanics. It is clear here that the discovery of the wave 
function and the specification of its physical meaning did not precede the discovery of the 
Schrodinger equation. The latter came first and the attempts to specify the meaning of the wave 
function have come later in a persisting on-going process. (Kragh, 1999). 
 
The mathematical representation in this case precedes the physical meaning, and it even 
gives the impression that it replaces it. It is some sort of a neo-Pythagoreanism which tends to 
deem the mathematical equation the only objective reality. The rest are partially or totally 
subjective. 
 
Also, the relationship between the laws of nature and natural phenomena seems to be 
turned upside down in quantum physics. Here, the laws of nature are no longer a basis for 
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explaining phenomena, but, rather, phenomena acquire the function of tools for exploring the 
physical meaning of physical equations. 
The same observations apply to Heisenberg’s Matrix Mechanics and Wigner’s 
distribution function (Wigner, 1932; Ghassib, 1996; 2012b). 
 
The equation comes first, and the never-ending quest for physical meaning commences 
afterwards. The problem is that this neo-Pythagorean transformation opens  physics wide open 
to irrational subjectivist interpretations. The very logic of scientific discovery has been turned 
upside down, endangering its very rationality. 
 
4. Physical Principles versus Mathematical Principles: 
 
A keen observer of the history of 20thcentury physics would readily notice a trend 
whereby mathematical principles are rapidly replacing physical principles. This is most 
conspicuously evident in the development of Einstein’s research project. 
Einstein started his scientific career with general universal physical principles, which are 
unchanging and absolute (Ghassib, 2010; Pais, 1982).                
 
He did not derive these universal principles from mathematical considerations, but from a 
new method for reading familiar experiments. That was precisely what Einstein did in 
formulating the principle of special relativity, the principle of the constancy of the speed of 
light, the equivalence principle, and, to a certain extent, the principle of general relativity. 
 
As we know, Einstein was prompted by these principles to revise the very notions of 
space and time and the very notion of spacetime geometry (Einstein, 1905). However, in the 
process of transition from special relativity to general relativity, he increasingly fell under the 
spell of mathematics, and turned from a search for physical principles to a search for 
mathematical principles ( Einstein, 1949; 1954; Pais, 1982). Accordingly, his field equations 
came as a result of a dialectical synthesis between physical principles and mathematical 
principles (Ghassib, 1999). 
 
Following this grand  synthesis, the mathematical tendency grew rapidly, in Einstein and 
in theoretical physics generally, until it has become overwhelmingly hegemonic, whereby 
mathematical principles have almost completely replaced universal physical principles. 
Thus, we have seen Einstein spending the last thirty years of his life in search of very abstract 
geometric principles for constructing a comprehensive unified field theory that would explain 
gravity, electromagnetism and matter, and would replace quantum mechanics and general 
relativity (Sauer, 2007). Is his failure to arrive at such a theory related to his shift from the 
physical to the mathematical? 
 
This shift was not confined to Einstein, but proved to be a continuing general trend in 
theoretical physics. This is noticeable in such theories as string theory, quantum gravity, loop 
quantum gravity and supergravity, and in such principles as gauge symmetry, duality principles 
and the holographic principle. 
 
These are highly abstract mathematical principles, with almost no empirical content-- 
very unlike the older physical principles, which had a conspicuous physical meaning 
 8 
organically related to experiment. Theoretical physicists have been turned into mere applied 
mathematicians and calculating machines.  
 
 
5. The Question of Logical Coherence in Physical Theory: 
 
If theory is to be a mathematically deductive system capable of providing definite testable 
results, it must possess a high degree of logical coherence and self-consistency (Ghassib, 
2012a).                           
However, historically speaking, no physical theory is perfectly logically coherent and 
self-consistent. All physical theories possess a degree of logical inhomogeneity. However, it is 
noticeable that, as physical theories have become more elaborate, theoretical as opposed to 
empirical, complex and ambitious, this element of logical incoherence has become more 
conspicuous and threatening, which prompts the questions: Is there a limit to the complexity 
and scope of physical theory? Is theorization intrinsically limited? Do physical theories collapse 
under their own weights? Do they grow in complexity until they reach a critical point of 
collapse? Would an affirmative answer to these questions entail a limit to systematic, scientific 
knowledge?  
This phenomenon of logical incoherence to the point of collapse has reached its zenith in 
quantum field theory and quantum gravity. Physics has found ways to get round these 
incoherences, but it has not overcome them. The problems of divergences in quantum field 
theory have been mellowed using normalization tricks, but only partially and not entirely 
satisfactorily. String theories and quantum gravity theories may have solved some of these 
incoherence problems, but at the expense of losing touch with the empirical world (Smolin, 
2006).                    
Will physics find a way to reverse this trend? Or, is scientific knowledge intrinsically 
limited? Or, is the universe partially knowable only? These are not mere philosophical 
questions, but genuinely physical questions, which must be faced by the theoretical physics 
community. The future of their discipline hangs on finding satisfactory answers to these 
dilemmas. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion: 
 
In this paper, we have drawn attention to, and elaborated, four foundational and structural 
dilemmas in theoretical physics, related to the question of objective reality, the relationship 
between mathematics and physical meaning, the relationship between physical principles and 
mathematical principles, and the questions of logical coherence in physical theory. We have 
highlighted the crucial relevance of these questions for the practice of theoretical physics. This 
should be understood as a call to the theoretical physics community to pause and ponder the 
very foundations of their practice. 
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